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For the past two decades, the combination of growing economic strain and maturing social
programs has created a harsh climate for the welfare state. While the durability of most social
programs through the advanced industrial world remains striking,  it was apparent by the mid-
eighties that the "modern" welfare state created during the Golden Age of postwar expansion had
reached an impasse in a double sense.
 First, the model of choice of the postwar decades -- social insurance cum citizenship
rights -- has rarely been used to respond to the new social risks generated by recent economic
restructuring.  The confidence of an earlier generation that universal social programs were not
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only compatible with, but also helped to drive, economic growth has been seriously eroded.  The
result has been "paradigm breakdown" and a search for new designs that might reproduce the
virtuous circle between consumption and production that prevailed from World War II to the
early seventies.  
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Second, analysis of the welfare politics of the 1980s give striking evidence that the old
politics of welfare state expansion have been transformed.  The political constituencies, coalitions,
3
and bargaining strategies that drove the period of expansion -- and on which our theoretical
models of  the welfare state were built -- appear to be no longer operative or, at least, operate in
new and unfamiliar ways. Old metaphors, such as the "citizen's wage"  intended to identify a
process in which labor negotiated its pay packet through the welfare state, as well as on the shop
floor, no longer appear to capture the central dynamics of contemporary welfare state politics.  
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These two  changes in welfare state politics raise two corresponding  questions. First, if2
      We should note that just as it has led the way towards the NIT/GI alternative, Canada led the way in 5
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"old" welfare state models are losing force, what sorts of emergent models will replace or
supplement the social insurance  cum citizenship design  of the postwar decades?   The answer to
this first question hinges critically on the answer to the second:  If the political dynamic that drove
the old welfare state is now exhausted, what social forces are shaping contemporary welfare state
politics?  
Without claiming to provide anything remotely like a full answer to these questions, we
address them by focusing on important but little-discussed reforms of the Canadian and American
welfare states  --  recent efforts to refashion income transfers by adopting Negative Income Tax-
style policies, producing greater integration with tax systems, increased “targeting” and improved
work incentives.  The shift in policy appeared in bold relief in the United States in 1996, when the
Earned Income Tax Credit, which fits the new framework, survived the Republican onslaught
against federal poverty programs intact, while the traditional means-tested program of AFDC did
not.    Yet this dramatic episode simply accelerated a shift that has been underway for some time. 
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Since the late 1970s, both countries have quietly developed extensive programs modeled on the
Negative Income Tax (NIT)/ Guaranteed Income (GI) proposals that were first considered (and
rejected) in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Thus our first concern: why did these previously rejected
efforts come to be embraced after 1975?  What political circumstances encouraged this broadly-
similar reorientation of policy especially at a time of growing disaffection with, and retrenchment
of, traditional means-tested programs for the poor in both countries?
Although NIT/GI designs have a clear affinity with traditional means-testing, they
represent, we argue, an historically novel form of state redistribution about which conventional
welfare state theory has precious little to say in regard to either origins or outcomes.   Unlike
traditional means-tested programs, NIT/GI programs are not for the poor alone.  They  can and
do reach well up the income distribution to cover electoral pluralities and even majorities. 
Consequently, conventional accounts of the politics of “poor relief” in “liberal” welfare states may3
      For the classic statement on welfare for the poor see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, 6
Regulating the Poor (New York: Vintage, 1972).    
provide a poor guide to the political dynamics and distributional consequences of this new form of
welfare provision.  
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NIT/GI  programs, we will argue, have proven ideally-suited to the new politics of
austerity.  Imposing austerity is a politically difficult enterprise, because of the popularity of most
social programs.  NIT/GI programs are flexible instruments for confronting these political
constraints.  Administered through tax codes, such reforms are often opaque to the general public,
because of the tax system’s intrinsic complexity, the possibility of burying changes in large
packages of policy reform, and because of the possibilities for very incremental implementation.  
The fact that these programs are comparatively cheap and targeted on needy groups also
facilitates the formation of novel, and unexpected, coalitions between those seeking retrenchment,
on the one hand, and those concerned about the poor, on the other.   New political coalitions have
arisen as the strength of organized labor -- traditionally skeptical of NIT-style reforms -- has
weakened.  Business actors are often supportive, because such programs can be designed in ways
which improve work incentives, and because of the possibilities of reducing overall social
spending.  Indeed, targeted tax/transfer programs are usually expanded in a context where other
welfare state programs experience cuts -- often as part of the same package of legislation.  The
inclusion of more generous benefits for some low-income groups has made it possible to find
support, or at least acquiescence, among moderates and liberals who would otherwise be
expected to oppose austerity.  Thus budgetary pressures, concern about labor market flexibility,
and the greater adaptability of systems of taxation have encouraged reform initiatives along these
lines.  The combined promise of poverty reduction, stronger work incentives, and relatively low
cost has made NIT-style reforms attractive to broad audiences in both countries.
This essay, however, examines divergence as well as commonality.  While both countries
moved towards targeted tax/transfer plans, they diverged considerably in both the extent and
content of policy change.  Efforts in the United States have been limited to the expansion of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides benefits for low-income working families with
children.  Reform has thus been tightly-linked to a strategy of encouraging “flexibility” at the4
      It is important to stress that in Canada, this shift has occurred in policies for the elderly as well as for working-
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age families with children.  To keep an already complex discussion within manageable limits, we have briefly
noted the major trends in Canada but have not tried to systematically contrast the Canadian and American
treatment of transfer programs for the elderly.  Such a discussion would provide a very useful complement to the
analysis offered here.
bottom of the labor market.  In effect, this program expands incentives to accept low-wage
employment, and we refer to it as a  wage subsidy system.  Canada’s reform has been more radical. 
Canada has introduced a major shift from universal programs to targeted ones, redesigning
traditional social programs and implementing new benefits based on NIT/GI principles. Unlike the
United States, Canadian reforms have included benefits for the non-working poor, and have
involved efforts to strengthen programs for all poor households.   These distinctive policy designs
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have led to quite divergent results.  While inequality has grown sharply in the United States,
redesigned social programs have  played an important role in mitigating many of these trends in
Canada.
Thus our second question: what explains the divergence in policy outcomes in the two
countries?  The answer is complex, but we emphasize three factors.  First, existing Canadian
policy structures -- the  policy legacies of previous decisions -- provided an effective “bridge” to a
NIT-style design, while such legacies were either small or non-existent in the United States. 
Second, opposition to a basic guarantee has been much more intense in the United States.  This
opposition stems partly from the role of racial antagonisms in undermining the appeal of a
guaranteed income, and partly from the peculiar regional character of the American political
economy, which has made powerful sectional interests, especially in the South, hostile to any
reforms that might undercut the low-wage labor market.  These same regional interests are
sympathetic to a wage subsidy system but fiercely resist extension of the model to non-wage
earners.  The third factor has been the fragmentation of national political institutions in the United
States.  This fragmentation has presented an additional obstacle to reform, giving those opposed
to a more extensive NIT/GI system an effective veto.
Exploring the political roots of these reforms and the sources of cross-national divergence
is helpful for evaluating the possibilities of moving towards a basic income scheme that goes
beyond the EITC in the United States.  Based on our comparative analysis of recent history, we5
      We use the term “liberal”in the classical sense to refer to policy regimes with minimal state provision 8
and extensive means-testing.  See  Gosta Esping-Andersen,  The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton,
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      See for instance Michael B. Katz,  In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in 9
America (New York: Basic Books), 1986.
find the prospects for such a development in the United States to be bleak.  Conditions in the
United States create relatively favorable politics for a wage subsidy, but not for a more extensive
NIT/GI as proposed, for example, by Block and Manza (this issue).   Those seeking to improve
assistance to poor, non-working families need to keep these political realities firmly in mind. 
 In Canada, the NIT/GI model has been firmly imprinted as the policy paradigm of choice
among legislators and officials and one can anticipate further reforms in this direction. In the
intermediate term, the poor have benefitted from this development.  Our conclusion, however,
adds a note of caution about whether a NIT/GI design can stabilize at a level that maintains these
gains. 
I.  The New “Liberal” Welfare States
In the comparative literature on welfare states,  the term “liberal” has become almost
synonymous with a tradition of means-testing inherited from the past with the United States and
Canada as leading exemplars.     Traditional means-testing is based on a test of assets as well as
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income, requiring families to “spend down” their resources to qualify. Benefits are subject to high
marginal tax rates of 100% (or more), imposing “welfare traps” that create little possibility or
incentive for recipients to work their way out of poverty.   Beneficiaries are typically subjected to
intrusive surveillance by public officials and moral codes of behavior.  And there is often
considerable administrative discretion in determining eligibility and benefit levels. Socially,
programs designed in this “poor law” tradition tend to create a sharp divide between the majority
of citizens and the minority “poor”, constituting the latter as a distinct, usually stigmatized, social
category (e.g “welfare mothers”).    The result, as has often been noted, is that the political
9
coalitions supporting such programs tend to be extremely weak.
 The implicit model underlying liberalism’s modern face,  the Negative Income Tax (NIT),
shares none of these attributes.  Under the NIT/GI design, low-income households are entitled to6
      In the countries of Southern Europe, including France, where traditionally almost all social benefits 10
were employment-based, modest ‘basic incomes’ have been implemented (France, Spain, Portugal) or are under
discussion (Italy)  for those with no connection to the labor market.  Britain has developed a program for working
poor families, Family Credit, which resembles the EITC.
their pre-tax income as well as a government income supplement.  The original idea, proposed by
Milton Friedman in 1943, was fairly simple: In good times, workers would pay taxes to
governments; in bad times governments would pay taxes to workers.  Eligibility is determined
exclusively by income reported in a tax return.  There is no surveillance of beneficiaries or
administrative discretion beyond that normally associated with the auditing of tax returns.  Tax
back rates on earnings and other sources of income are always  much less than 100%.  One result
is that benefits can reach into the ranks of the middle class, albeit at a diminishing rate.  One can
usefully think of the NIT/GI design as the reverse image of yet another traditional “welfare”
program in the United States — the home mortgage interest deduction which provides large
benefits to high income earners with high marginal tax rates, modest benefits to low income
earners, and none at all to those with no taxable income.  NIT/GI programs, in contrast, provide
the largest benefits to low income earners, benefits decline as other income rises, and they
disappear altogether at higher income levels.
    NIT-like designs for the welfare state have typically been proposed as a universal
guaranteed income for all citizens, either as an alternative to traditional social insurance programs
(e.g. Friedman), as an addition to them (see below), or in some mix of the two (see Block and
Manza, this volume).   In practice, however, almost all NIT programs are selective in the
populations they target -- the elderly and families with children in Canada, the working poor in the
United States.    New Zealand is arguably the most striking contemporary example of a welfare
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state redesigned along NIT lines. Programs based on NIT principles now include unemployment
insurance, sickness benefits, old age benefits, child benefits and student loans.
Every NIT model is defined by three parameters: the guarantee level (the level of
benefit provided to people with no other income; the tax-back rate (the rate at which benefits
are reduced as the recipient gains income); and the break-even point (the income level at which
benefits disappear).  A high guarantee level is desirable to provide people with adequate7
      National Council of Welfare, “A Guide to the Guaranteed Income,”  (Ottawa: National Council of 11
Welfare, 1988).
      Keith Banting, “The Social Policy Divide: The Welfare State in Canada and the United States,” in 12
Keith Banting, George Hoberg and Richard Simeon, eds.,  Degrees of Freedom: Canada and the United States in a
Changing World (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 1997, pp. 267-309.
incomes and a low tax back rate is desirable to encourage people to work.  But such a
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combination means that the break-even point is very high and so are the costs.  In practice,
virtually all NIT proposals are broken into two tiers in order to contain costs and to maintain
work incentives. One tier is intended for people who are not expected to work (such as the
elderly) with a high guarantee level, a high tax-back rate, and a low break-even level.    The
second tier, for those expected to work, typically has a lower tax-back rate, and a higher
relative break-even point but a lower guarantee level.  
Both the United States and Canada have begun to incorporate such features into their
systems of social transfers, although the shift has been far more extensive in Canada.  The result
has been the remarkable finding reported by Banting (see Table 1):   While the share of targeted
cash benefits as a percentage of total income transfers in the US held steady at around 20%
between 1960 and 1992, in Canada, selective (targeted) benefits rose from 21% to 52% of income
transfers, rising most rapidly after 1975.   Canada now spends more on selective income transfers
12
than it does on universal social insurance programs.  Overwhelmingly, these Canadian trends
reflect the expansion of income-tested supplements, rather than traditional social assistance
programs.
Table 1.  Selective Expenditures as a Proportion of Total Income Security, 1960-1992 (in %)
19601965197019751980198519901992
Canada  20.8  27.6  30.8  29.3  37.4  35.5  47.5  52.0
United States    20.4  18.8  22.8  24.3  20.9  16.7  16.3  17.8
Source: Keith Banting, “The Social Policy Divide,” 19978
      Effective July 1998, low-income families will be eligible for a maximum Canada Child Tax Benefit of 13
$1,625 for the first child (a 59% increase) and $1,425 for the second and each additional child.  The existing
supplement of $213 for each child under age 7 for families without child care expenses will be maintained,
bringing the maximum Canada Child Tax Benefit for children under age 7 to $1,838 for the first child and $1,638
for the second and each additional child.  Maximum benefits will go to families with net incomes up to $20,921.
      The legislation would also end the Working Income Supplement (WIS) a small income supplement for 14
the “working poor” similar to the EITC.
Canada introduced the income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) for the
elderly in 1966, supplementing the universal flat benefit Old Age Security (OAS) and earnings
related Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP).  GIS was expanded in stages during the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s.  Partial income-testing of the universal OAS benefit began in
1989 with the imposition of a tax “clawback” of benefits from high income seniors. The 1996
federal budget essentially completed the transition, announcing a new family income-tested
Seniors Benefit (SB) to replace OAS, GIS and the age and pension income tax credits, effective
2001.
The same “liberal” trajectory has been followed for programs for the non-elderly as well. 
Following a complex series of changes beginning in 1978, Canada finally abandoned universal
family allowances (launched in 1945) and child tax exemptions, replacing them by 1993 with a
single income-tested Child Tax Benefit (CTB), a refundable tax credit that goes to both working
and non-working poor families.  The 1997 federal budget raised the CTB budget dramatically 
and announced a much more ambitious restructuring of child benefits aimed at building a new
national child benefit system made up of an enriched and redesigned federal Canada Child Tax
Benefit and varying provincial child benefits.   The objective is to take “children off welfare” by
13
replacing child welfare payments with an income-tested child benefit paid to all low-income
families with children, regardless of the family’s major source of income (e.g., welfare,
employment, unemployment insurance or some combination thereof).    Unemployment
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Insurance benefits were income-tested on the basis of family income for high income families in
1979.  The Employment Insurance (EI) Act which took effect in 1996 (replacing the
Unemployment Insurance Act), lowered the family income threshold for testing from $63,570 to9
      Earnings replacement rates were lowered from 57 to 55 percent but raised to 60 percent for low income 15
earners.  The addition of a Family Income Supplement for unemployed parents with family income under $25,291
raises this figure to 80%.
      United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means,  Where Your Money goes: The 16
1994-1995 Green Book (Washington: Brasseys), 1994, p. 704.  
$48,750 and conditioned replacement rates for low income earners on the presence of children.  
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Indeed, apart from health care, the earnings-related C/QPP, workers compensation and some
social services it is difficult to identify a single significant social program that is not now subject to
some form of targeting.
The United States has taken much more modest steps in modernizing its liberal welfare
state.  After the failure of Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) that aimed to provide a
guaranteed annual income for all American families, the United States succeeded in implementing
a very limited Earned Income Tax Credit for the working poor.  Nevertheless, the American
system of income transfers for the poor shows some indication of following something like the
Canadian trajectory.  The annual cost of the once-modest EITC grew from $2 billion to $12
billion between 1986 and 1992.  And the 1993 budget added $20 billion over five years, at the
same time that it legislated significant savings in middle class programs such as Medicare.  By
1996, annual outlays reached $25 billion -- almost double the level of federal expenditures on
AFDC.  In 1986, some 7 million families were covered by the EITC.  By 1996, the figure will be
approaching 19 million.   The maximum value of the EITC is currently around $3500, and some
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benefits are available to families earning up to $28,500 a year.  While part of the EITC’s growth
was due to rising demand,  the main reason for expansion has been sizable real benefit increases
introduced in 1986, 1990, and 1993.  The shifting character of the American income transfer
system reflects both the expansion of the EITC and the retrenchment of traditional means-tested
programs (most dramatically in the welfare “reform” legislation of 1996) and social insurance
programs like unemployment insurance (see Table 2).  It is crucial to emphasize that unlike food
stamps, AFDC, or unemployment insurance -- and in contrast to the NIT-style programs
introduced in Canada -- the EITC provides no benefits to those without earned income.10
      Rene Morissette, John Myles, and Garnett Picot, “Earnings Polarization in Canada, 1969-1991,” in  17
Labour Market Polarization and Social Policy, ed. Keith Banting (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1995), 23-
50.
Table 2.  Federal Spending on EITC and AFDC, 1980-1996 ($ in billions)
EITC AFDC
1980  2.0  6.4
1981  1.9  6.9
1982  1.8  6.9
1983  1.8  7.3
1984  1.6  7.7
1985  2.1  7.8
1986  2.0  8.2
1987  3.9  8.9
1988  5.9  9.1
1989  6.6  9.4








AFDC expenditures exclude state level spending and administrative costs.
Source: United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means,  Where Your
Money Goes: The 1994-95 Green Book (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s), 1994, pp. 389, 700.
Thus while there are similarities in the policy shifts undertaken in Canada and the United
States, there are major differences in both the extent and character of policy change.  These
differences have clearly had an impact on economic outcomes.  Both countries have been buffeted
by major changes in the labor market over the past decades.  As in the United States, the earnings
of low income workers in Canada declined in the eighties while those of high income earners
rose.   However, unlike the United States experience, rising inequality in  labor market incomes in
17
Canada was offset by  social transfers, so that the final distribution of total family income and the11
      Rebecca Blank and Maria Hanratty, “Responding to Need: A Comparison of Social Safety Nets in 18
Canada and the United States,” in  Small Differences that Matter: Labor Markets and Income Maintenance in
Canada and the United States, ed. David Card and Richard Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993), 191-231; Roger Love and Susan Poulin, “Family Income Inequality in the 1980s,”   Canadian Economic
Observer, September 1991, 4.1-4.13.
      John Myles and Jill Quadagno, “The Politics of Income Security for the Elderly in Canada and the 19
United States: Explaining the Difference,” in Ted Marmor and Tim Smeeding, eds.,  Economic Security for the
Elderly:  North American Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute), 1994.
      Timothy Smeeding, Barbara Torrey, and Lee Rainwater, “Going to Extremes: An International 20
Perspective on the Economic Status of the U.S. Aged,”  (Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper #87, 1993). 
For international comparisons, “poverty” is defined as less than 50% of adjusted median household income.  
incidence of poverty in Canada remained stable.    In the United States, changes in social
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programs exacerbated rather than offset market trends, with the result that between 1970 and
1986 the Canadian poverty rate (measured by U.S. standards) moved from 6.9 points  above the
U.S. level to 4.5 points  below it.   The story for the elderly is even more dramatic.  In the mid-
seventies, old-age poverty rates in Canada were well above American levels.   By the mid-
19
eighties, only 7% of Canadian seniors were living below internationally standardized poverty lines
compared to 22% in the United States.
20
Thus, the recent liberal restructuring of North America raises two interesting questions
about the politics of social policy.  First, why have both the United States and Canada moved
towards an increased reliance on integrated, targeted tax/transfer programs?  Second, why has
this move been more extensive -- and more effectively geared towards reducing poverty -- in
Canada than it has been in the United States?  Section II reviews the evolution of political
struggles over these programs in the two countries.
II.  The Politics of Income-Testing
Nothing in traditional welfare state theory tells us very much about the conditions likely to
favor the  expansion of income-tested programs of the sort that has occurred in both Canada and
the United States in the past two decades.  We use the term "expansion" in a double sense: to
refer to the growth of NIT-style testing as the model of choice for social transfers as compared to
social insurance or demogrant programs; and, second, to refer to the real growth in benefits for
"targets" of such programs.  Indeed, there is precious little welfare state theory of any sort that12
      Esping-Andersen’s important welfare state typology is a case in point. His is an  historical typology 21
derived from actual welfare states as they developed in the postwar decades. It does not exhaust the possible range
of welfare states forms, and hence is less useful for identifying new and emergent models of welfare state provision. 
leads us to expect this result. The reason, we think, is simple: Virtually all welfare state theory is
theory  about the long historical trajectory of welfare state growth from the 19th century through
the "golden age" ( les trentes glorieuses) that ended symbolically with the first great oil shock of
1973.   The NIT/GI model comes into its own after this age has passed, when the welfare state
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enters a period of containment and retrenchment.  
Although NIT-style blueprints had been discussed since the 1940s, serious consideration
of Milton Friedman’s proposal for a Guaranteed Annual Income (or negative income tax)
emerged in both Canada and the United States during the late 1960s, a period of major social
policy innovation in both countries.  These initial attempts, however, were soundly defeated.  It
would be another decade -- around the late 1970s -- before Friedman-style programs began to
expand in both countries. 
The reversal of fortune of these programs, from failure in the late 1960s to success from
the late 1970s on, is telling.   NIT programs are the progeny of austerity.  At a time of budgetary
stress, NIT-style reforms possess a number of attractive features which allow them to compete
effectively both with traditional means-tested programs and, at times, with more universal ones. 
There are two broad reasons why this is so.  The first is that these programs provide potential
common ground for a powerful political coalition.  This coalition includes public and private
actors interested in controlling public expenditure, those with an interest in increasing labor
market flexibility, and those seeking to increase the incomes of poor and near-poor households. 
Because these programs are much more targeted than universal programs, they offer hard-pressed
public officials (and sympathetic private sector actors such as those in the financial community)
the promise of expenditure restraint.  At the same time, the structure of gradually phased-out
benefits is widely considered to be more effective than traditional means-tested programs in
sustaining work incentives -- a matter of considerable importance to many employers.
Political actors on the left are likely to be more ambivalent.  Labor unions have generally
been opposed.  Crucially, however, this opposition has become less important as the political13
      R. Kent Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,”  Journal of Public Policy, 1986; Pierson, “New 22
Politics of the Welfare State.”
      On the politics of stealth see Grattan Gray (pseudonym for Ken Battle), “Social policy by Stealth,” 23
Policy Options  (1990): 17-29, and Douglas Arnold,  The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven: Yale
University Press), 1990.
influence of organized labor has declined.  Moderates and liberals, including advocacy groups for
the poor, may have mixed feelings when the  quid pro quo for expanding these targeted programs
is cutbacks in universal transfers.  Yet they may see such cutbacks as probable in any event, and
the possibility of increasing real benefits to those with low incomes will often lead them to support
such initiatives, or at least serve to mute their opposition.  One might question the clout of such
groups in comparison with the influence of employers and finance ministries.  In a context where
austerity threatens to generate a popular outcry, however, such groups can provide essential
political cover.  In contexts where it is difficult to assemble legislative majorities (such as the
United States), these groups may also have some influence with moderate politicians who control
crucial swing votes.
This points to the second major advantage of NIT-style programs, which is their capacity
to limit the popular reactions against welfare state reform which make other kinds of
programmatic initiatives difficult.  The contemporary politics of the welfare state has become the
politics of blame avoidance.   Austerity means that reforms almost always require painful
22
cutbacks in existing programs, which are not only backed by entrenched interests but generally
command widespread public support. Voters have often reacted strongly to visible cuts in social
policies.  In this context, operating through the tax system greatly increases policy makers’
flexibility.  Shifting to this arena partly circumvents the traditional interest group networks that
support existing social programs. The rules governing reform of taxes are often looser than those
governing changes in social programs.  Perhaps most important, the intricacy of the tax system
makes it easier for governments to present changes as relatively technical, or as part of large and
complex package deals, or to phase in changes incrementally to minimize public outcry. 
Complexity and opacity facilitate a “politics of stealth” which make it harder for opponents to
mobilize support among mass publics.   Indeed, a striking aspect of the move towards GI/NIT
23
programs in both countries has been the limited public discussion and conflict over policy change. 14
While “welfare reform” has generated headlines and protests, major modifications of tax-based
income transfers have not.
Thus NIT/GI programs are well-adapted to the new politics of the welfare state.  They
rely on new political coalitions, which employ new, low-profile strategies suitable for an
environment of austerity.  These new political dynamics are evident in the histories of NIT/GI
policies in both countries since the mid-1960s.  Although the origins of these new policies can be
traced back to the earlier era of welfare state expansion, they have flourished in the harsher
environment ushered in by the oil crisis of 1973. 
Canada
At least since the sixties, when Canadian nationalism took on strong anti-American
overtones and Canadian social provision began to expand beyond U.S. levels, the contrast
between a mean-spirited (“means-tested”) American welfare state and Canada’s more generous
universalistic welfare state has formed a core element of Canadian political identities and of
Canadian political rhetoric.  Ask a Canadian what distinguishes Canada from the United States
and likely as not she will take out her health insurance card.  In Canada, national health insurance
covers hospital and medical services on a universal basis without copayments, deductibles or other
user fees.  Universality — the provision of services and income support conditioned only by
citizenship and residency — have been distinguishing features of the Canadian welfare state since
the introduction of universal family allowances in 1944 and universal Old Age Security (OAS)
benefits in 1951. The rhetoric, however, has masked a long ineluctable shift from universality as
traditionally understood  — citizenship cum residency as qualifying conditions -- to selectivity in
Canadian social spending.
The result of these reforms, however,  was not a leap into the past and a return to the
“poor law” tradition of  American style “means-testing.”  Rather, it represents a new model for
the design of social programs, a novel form which departs from the three traditional models for
welfare state spending: earnings-related social insurance, universal flat benefits, and means-tested
social assistance targeted on the “poor”.  The distinctive feature of the Canadian welfare state in
the 1990s is that the NIT model has become virtually hegemonic while in the United States it15
remains (and may continue to remain) in its infancy.  
Three factors played especially critical roles in accounting for Canadian adoption of the
NIT design.  The first was an early and somewhat accidental adoption of a Guaranteed Income for
seniors, which provided the opportunity for extensive “policy learning” concerning both the
administrative and political advantages of this design.  The second, more critical, element was the
existing programmatic structure of a system of universal flat benefits financed from general
revenue, which had been created during the forties (for children) and fifties (for the elderly).  
Unlike contributory programs that establish pseudo-proprietary claims on benefits (benefits have
been “earned” and expenditures are linked to earmarked contributions), claims based on
citizenship alone are especially vulnerable to income-testing. As we shall see, this vulnerability is a
generic feature of flat rate citizenship entitlements,  not a distinctively Canadian phenomenon. 
Thirdly, under conditions of retrenchment, proposals to shift from “universality” to greater
selectivity (income-testing) were able to generate rather novel political coalitions of supporters —
from business elites and conservative critics who correctly saw these changes as a way of cutting
welfare expenditures  and from progressive policy reformers who saw the potential for greater
redistribution to the poor under conditions when the need for redistribution was rising. 
Our claim that widespread adoption of a NIT-like design in social programs was a child of
retrenchment first has to deal with the obvious anomaly that the first implementation of such a
design, the Guaranteed Income Supplement for seniors introduced in 1966, came at the height of
welfare state expansion.  In conjunction with OAS, the GIS provided a modest but real
guaranteed annual income for all those age 65 or over. Benefits were income-tested but not
means-tested (assets were excluded from the test) and rather than the 100% tax-back rate
common to social assistance programs, benefits were reduced by only 50 cents for each dollar of
additional income.  Although implemented during expansion, the politics of the GIS legislation
prefigured later reforms in significant ways, a politics that could be characterized as one of
containment if not retrenchment. 
As Haddow recounts, throughout the long discussions of "poverty" policy during the
sixties, political parties, business interests and organized labor remained largely indifferent or on16
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the sidelines.     "Universal" social programs promised to deliver votes;  anti-poverty policy
24
focused on the bottom of the income distribution did not.  Describing the position of the parties
during the review leading to the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) reform in 1966, he notes: "...
none of the political parties played a significant role in shaping social assistance reform. They
were far more interested in broader components of the welfare state, which had greater electoral
appeal."  
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The GIS was first proposed in February 1966 by the Special Senate Committee on Aging
directed by Senator David Croll, chair of the Special Senate Committee on Aging.      The
26
proposal, however, was initially resisted by both Cabinet and by federal officials.    It was finally
27
adopted as a "temporary measure" in the face of enormous pressure from opposition parties, the
New Democratic Party (NDP) in particular, to bring down old age poverty by dramatically raising
the universal old age demogrant (OAS) to $100 per month.  Adoption of the GIS proposal was a
far cheaper solution.  The subsequent expansion of the GIS was driven by similar considerations -
- first as a strategy to resist broader expansions in earnings-related public pensions (the C/QPP) at
the beginning of the eighties, and later as a way of off-setting some of the pain associated with
curtailment of universal OAS benefits.  While the relative value of OAS and CPP benefits has
stagnated since the 1970s,  GIS benefits moved up sharply in relation to average wages.
28
Politicians and officials learned several important lessons from their experience with the
GIS.  First, small marginal changes could produce large political pay-offs.  For example, when
pressed to dramatically expand the earnings-related CPP in the early eighties as a way of reducing17
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old age poverty, the government responded with a modest increase in GIS benefits for single
(mainly female) seniors demonstrating that the problem could be addressed through other, less
costly, solutions.  Second, by careful targeting, large numbers of voters would be included even
though, for many, benefits would be quite small.   A simplified tax form generated very high
29
take-up rates (over 90%) even among low income seniors who would not normally file a tax
return. Unlike traditional means-tests which have high overhead costs, administering an income-
based test through the tax system proved to be relatively inexpensive for both the assessment and
delivery of benefits.     Finally, within the context of Canadian federalism, adjusting benefits
30
through the tax system proved to be far more politically feasible than adjusting traditional direct
transfer programs. While social programs of all sorts have always represented contested terrain
between federal and provincial governments, and have often created “joint-decision traps” which
make reform extremely difficult, the tax system is under the undisputed jurisdiction of the federal
government.  
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These broader implications were not immediately obvious, however, nor were they initially
of much interest despite the fact that through the early 1970s, discussions of Canadian social
policy reform became firmly fixed on the concept of a universal Guaranteed Annual Income
(GAI).  The topic originated within the welfare bureaucracy in 1968 and 1969.  The first proposal
(the "family income security plan" or FISP) was brought to Cabinet in April 1970 by the Minister
of Health and Welfare, John Munro, where it was rejected as too costly.  
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That the topic emerged to dominate policy debate in the 1970s is largely due to the basic18
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cleavage which has driven federal politics since the 1960s, namely the future of Quebec in the
Canadian federation.  In 1971, Quebec's Commission of Inquiry on Social Affairs produced the
Castonguay-Nepveu Report which recommended adoption of a GAI as part of an expansionary
program of reform that included better social insurance and family allowances.  That summer,
Premier Bourassa rejected the Victoria Charter -- a new constitution for Canada -- because of its
ambiguity in dealing with income security.   To appease Quebec, the federal government launched
the Federal Provincial Social Security Review, the centerpiece of which was a form of GAI similar
to that proposed in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report.   In April 1973, the Liberal government
33
issued an Orange Paper outlining a two-tier GI, income support for unemployable persons and
income supplementation for the employed.  Support for and interest in the proposals, however,
were negligible.   Haddow concludes that among the political parties, only the right-wing
Créditistes under Réal Caouette, expressed enthusiasm for the GI model.  Significantly, they saw
it as a replacement for, not as an addition to, existing social insurance schemes.   Business groups
34
expressed caution and labor groups indifference toward the strategy.  
The long debate over a GI design that lasted until 1976 was part of a politics of expansion
and it failed. The Orange Paper presented the GAI as an addition to, not a substitute for, existing
social programs. Implementation would produce large increases in social expenditures, not cost
savings. As deficits began to rise after 1973, the expansionary version of the GAI proposal went
nowhere.  
All this began to change in 1978.  After returning from an economic summit in Bonn,
Prime Minister Trudeau called his cabinet ministers to Ottawa to discuss how $2 billion in
spending cuts would be distributed.   Canada's universal program of Family Allowances was
35
singled out for attention and the $28 a month benefit per child projected for 1979 reduced to $20.
To soften the blow of this and other cuts,  a refundable tax credit designed on NIT principles was
targeted at families with children.  A family with two children would receive a full credit of $40019
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at net incomes less than $18,000 per year, a credit of $300 if net income was $20,000, and the
credit would disappear above net incomes of $26,000. As Guest points out, however, since
median family income of families with children was $19,500, a substantial majority (69 percent)
received the full credit and many others a partial credit.   Those qualifying for the full credit
36
received a substantial increase to $440 per child per year versus the $336 they would have
received under the old system.  In the same year, the principle of income-testing "at the top"  was
introduced to the unemployment insurance program. High income claimants would now have to
pay back up to 30 percent of all UI benefits paid in a taxation year.  
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The 1980s brought an explosion of support for GI-like reform of Canada's tax-transfer
programs, but now as an  alternative to the social insurance-demogrant models of the 1960s. 
Major reviews included the report of the McDonald Commission (1985) which examined the
entire social safety net and the Forget Commission's study of unemployment insurance (1986). 
Both recommended reforming the system along GI principles at the expense of universal
programs and the non-actuarial elements of contributory plans. 
Throughout the 70s, a guaranteed annual income had been the "holy grail" of Canada's
anti-poverty lobbies. During the eighties, they found themselves joined by new and unexpected
allies from among business elites and other traditional critics of social spending.  Only organized
labor remained ambivalent.  As Haddow recounts, from the first discussions of a GI strategy in
1966 until the late eighties, the attitude of organized labor and the social democratic NDP was at
best indecisive.   Labor's main agenda was expansion of social insurance -- UI and pensions in
38
particular. The Canadian Labor Congress supported a negative income tax in 1975 largely
because it saw no need to oppose it. But the support was tepid at best.  In 1988, the CLC
embraced the principle of a GI but with considerable qualification. Labor’s concern was that the20
      Haddow, “Canadian Organized Labour,” p. 356.   39
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GI model would become a substitute for full employment and a subsidy for low wage employers.
 While organized labor remained ambivalent,  the crusade for a GI/NIT design was joined
in the 1980s by business leaders, neo-conservative critics of the welfare state,  and, for the first
time, a national governing party, the Progressive Conservatives who came to power in 1984. 
Their aim, however, was not to supplement existing social programs but to eliminate them,
replacing the existing structure of universal flat benefits and earnings-related programs with a
universal guaranteed income. For neo-conservatives,  more targeting would rid the nation of the
“costly and unnecessary” practice of providing benefits to middle and upper income families. 
Employers saw a national system of GI benefits financed from general revenues  as an alternative
to minimum wage laws and expensive social insurance programs financed from payroll taxes.  A
GI design also had the advantage of eliminating welfare traps and work disincentives created by
the 100% tax back rates in traditional social assistance programs. In 1984, the Canadian
Manufacturer's Association (CMA) proposed to the McDonald Commission that Canada's
existing welfare state -- including pensions, UI, family allowances and social assistance -- be
replaced by a comprehensive GAI. The result they suggested could save as much as $30 billion
per year.   In their final proposals, the Commissioners heeded this advice.
39
  CEOs can make such proposals because, unlike politicians, they have no need to please
the median voter. In an effort to implement the first part of the CMA strategy, elimination of
universal benefits, Finance Minister Michael Wilson proposed to deindex  Old Age Security in his
first budget introduced in May 1985.  The program would disappear, but slowly, as inflation
eroded the real value of benefits.  The result was a political debacle for the Conservatives and, by
August, Wilson was forced to retreat.
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 The second time out, Wilson was more successful.  In 1989, the government introduced
legislation that was scarcely noticed by the electorate.  Rather than eliminate universal programs,21
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      Ken Battle and Leon Muszynski, “One Way to Fight Child Poverty,” (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of 42
Social Policy), 1995.
      Unlike the OAS “clawback” the income threshold for benefit reduction will be fully indexed against 43
inflation.
cash benefits would be subject to an income test --  “clawed back” from high income recipients. 
OAS benefits for individuals with more than $51,765 were reduced by 15 percent for every dollar
of income above the threshold with all benefits disappearing at approximately $89,000 per year. 
The new proposal shrewdly utilized the structure of a GI/NIT system to pursue a politics of
stealth. Since the vast majority of the elderly were unaffected, and few legislators or media
representatives understood the legislation, it was barely noticed.   
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A similar strategy was adopted with respect to the universal Family Allowance.  Wilson 
successfully deindexed Family Allowances in 1985 and in 1989 benefits were “clawed back” from
high income families.  In 1993, the Tories  introduced the income-tested Child Tax Benefit, 
formally ending universal family allowances.   Low income families, however,  were clearly
winners, as they were in the long series of reforms since 1978 that led up to the new system.  
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While the majority of families saw their benefits reduced, most retained some claims in the
program. Above $25,921 benefits are taxed back at a rate of 2.5 cents for every dollar in
additional family income for one child and 5 cents for two or more children.  For families with
two children under 7, the benefit only disappears entirely when family income exceeds $75, 241.
Emulating their predecessors,  the Liberals proposed in their 1996 budget to apply a
similar formula to the old age security system.  The new Seniors Benefit, slated to come into
effect in 2002,  will eliminate OAS, integrating it with the income tested Guaranteed Income
Supplement.  Benefits will be increased slightly ($120 per year) for low income seniors and
progressively reduced for higher income elderly families, reducing or eliminating benefits for
about one quarter of elderly households.  
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From the age of expansion to the age of retrenchment, then, the politics of the guaranteed
income changed dramatically in Canada.  The NIT design, largely spurned by elected officials in22
      Indeed the design for the 1996 Seniors Benefit and the 1997 child benefit redesign were largely the 44
work of Ken Battle, long-time Director of the National Council of Welfare and, since 1992, President of the
Caledon Institute of Social Policy.
      On the significance of policy legacies see for example Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, “State 45
Structures and the Possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the
United States,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds.,  Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1985, pp. 107-63.
      See John Myles and Jill Quadagno, “Recent Trends in Public Pension Reform: A Comparative View,” 46
in Keith Banting and Robin Boadway, eds.,  Reform of Retirement Income Policy: International and Canadian
Perspectives (Kingston: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies), 1997, pp. 247-271.
the age of expansion, became the model of choice after 1978, not as a supplement to traditional
programs but as a replacement for them.  With a single instrument, expenditures could be
contained by reducing or eliminating benefits for higher income families while part of the savings
could be applied to enrich the benefits of the most disadvantaged.   Because of this, it was
possible to generate new and unanticipated political coalitions around a program of retrenchment. 
While reluctant to see the demise of “universality,” many potential critics of retrenchment were
silent or even actively supported reforms that promised to benefit low income families.   Though
44
the social policy lobbies were often vocal in their opposition to the end of “universality,” the
redesign of programs in a way that raises benefits for low income families and imposes significant
losses on a minority of households made mobilization of serious opposition to the cuts a daunting
task.  
One key to explaining the success of such a strategy lies, paradoxically, in the possibilities
opened up by the policy legacies of Canada’s traditional cash benefit system of  universal flat
benefits financed from general revenue and with only citizenship and residency as qualifying
conditions.   Since benefits are in no way linked to contributions, beneficiaries do not have the
45
pseudo-proprietary claims to benefits associated with contributory programs such as Social
Security.  Indeed, citizenship entitlements have proven vulnerable to income-testing not just in
Canada but also in virtually every other nation with a tradition of citizenship entitlements. Since
the 1980s, partial or total  “clawbacks” of universal flat-rate pensions from middle and upper
income earners have been implemented in Australia, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Iceland, Sweden
and, especially, New Zealand.  In contrast,  proposals to income-test contributory schemes along
4623
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the lines suggested by Peter Petersen and the Concord Coalition in the United States have been
thus far unsuccessful, and have hardly reached the political agenda in other Bismarckian systems.  
47
Based on an understanding of traditional means-tests, it has long been social science lore
that the shift from universal to selective benefits will, in the long term, make the poor worse off.
Have, as the conventional view suggests, the "poor" in Canada suffered as a result of these
changes? In the intermediate term, at least, the answer is no.  Income-testing of social benefits for
families with children have reduced social transfers directed at middle income groups while raising
benefits for those at the bottom of the income distribution. This proved to be especially important
in light of a  sharp rise in earnings inequality during the 1980s.  Until now, the Canadian system of
social transfers has been successful in stabilizing the final distribution of family incomes and
containing child poverty.    More open to question is the long term viability of Canada's GI
48
welfare state, a question to which we return in the conclusion.
The United States
Although much more modest in scope and containing very important distinctions in
design, the expansion of NIT-type spending in the U.S. has also been a child of retrenchment. The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has been one of the few social programs, along with prison
construction, that has expanded since the seventies.  At least before the arrival of a huge class of
vigorously anti-government Republicans in the mid-term elections of 1994, it received widespread
support on both the left and the right.  Again, we are interested in two questions.  First, why, as in
Canada, has the single exemplar of a NIT-type program been so successful in an era of
retrenchment?  Second, why has this programmatic shift been comparatively modest in the United
States, and, crucially, limited to the working poor?24
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In the United States, serious discussions of a reformed system of transfers for low-income
households began in the last days of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty.  The context was the
racial turmoil in American cities, growing frustration among liberals and conservatives alike with
mounting welfare rolls under AFDC, on the one hand, and the work disincentives of traditional
means-tested welfare, on the other. As Jill Quadagno recounts, the first major recommendation
for an NIT-type program came from Johnson's  Heineman Commission in 1968.  The Commission
initially considered and then rejected a jobs strategy as too expensive and worth little to millions
of workers earning little more than the minimum wage. Instead it recommended a universal
income supplement for the working poor. As Quadagno observes:
Although a wage supplement represented a radical departure from existing measures, it
rested on premises compatible with business interests. It accepted the spread of low wage
labor as inevitable and it provided an alternative to a minimum wage... And unlike the
inefficient social insurance programs, which paid regardless of need, income supplements
only paid benefits to the poor or near-poor.
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The  Heineman Commission's proposals went nowhere, but a few years later the prospect of a
national Guaranteed Income for families, the Family Assistance Plan, almost became reality.
Ironically, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) was proposed by a Republican president,
Richard Nixon.   Nixon's position in the development of American social policy remains
50
something of a puzzle. Concerned about racial unrest and operating in a climate that was more
liberal on social policy issues than the one faced by other Republican presidents, Nixon sought to
reform rather than repudiate the War on Poverty.  The political goal appears to have been that of
capturing white working class voters alienated by the civil rights (and anti-transfer) thrust of the
Johnson era.
Spurred on by moderate advisors, including Johnson administration-carryover Daniel
Moynihan, Nixon saw a national welfare system, organized as a negative income tax with strong
work incentives, as a rational piece of social engineering.  Support from a Republican President25
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significantly undercut Republican resistance.  Many Republicans in Congress, however, were
shocked to see their president backing a guaranteed income proposal, and continued to oppose
the legislation.
Business, too, was fragmented.   Large, capital-intensive firms (represented by the
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National Association of Manufacturers) were generally supportive of FAP, but it was not a
legislative priority.   They become more hostile, however, after unions successfully demanded that
Nixon incorporate a separate tier of public sector job-creation and protection for the minimum
wage.  Smaller, more labor-intensive firms, were strongly opposed to the plan.  Here it is critical
that FAP, while strengthening work incentives in the North where relatively generous welfare
benefits would not be increased, might have had the opposite effect in areas, like the South, where
it would have greatly increased the availability of income support to those out of work.  Through
organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, small businesses lobbied vigorously against
reform.  As Jill Quadagno observes, "with 3,800 trade associations and local chambers and a
direct membership of more than 35,000 business firms, the Chamber wielded a mighty club."  
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Thus, despite disagreement within the business community, those groups that mobilized were
generally eager to stop FAP.
The antipathy of labor-intensive, low-wage firms to a plan which would have provided
income to the able-bodied but non-working poor was more than matched by the hostility of
Southern politicians.  Indeed, the role of Southern political interests, a crucial factor in shaping
the American welfare state, is clearly evident in the debates over income transfers during the last
quarter-century.  This topic is a complex one, but a key factor for current purposes has been the
long-standing southern strategy to block policies which threatened the low-wage, nonunion
environment that made the region attractive to potentially mobile businesses.   Southern interests
5326
Leibfried and Pierson, eds.,  European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings), 1995, pp. 301-28.
      Quadagno,  Color of Welfare, pp. 129-30. 54
      Liberal opposition to FAP had complex roots:  contempt for Nixon, confidence that time was on their 55
side since a Democrat would soon be in the White House, fear of alienating critics on their left (including the
National Welfare Rights Organization, which termed FAP "an act of oppression").  A desire to preserve state-level
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liberals' arguments look seriously flawed.  The anticipated liberal revival never appeared.  Northerners badly
have consistently opposed policies that would have established a national floor on benefits for the
non-working poor, and in the process raised the “reservation wage” of southern workers. 
Proposals for a more national system of welfare, such as FAP, would have produced considerable
net public transfers to the South, where poverty rates were highest and federal taxes were lowest. 
But these proposals also would have jeopardized the South’s major competitive advantage within
the American economy: the availability of a cheap, nonunionized workforce.  Southern politicians
have therefore consistently opposed, while Northern interests have often supported, proposals
that would have paid disproportionate benefits in the South from taxes on the rest of the country. 
FAP's high minimum benefits and requirement that families with unemployed heads be
made eligible for assistance would have had a revolutionary impact in the South; according to
HEW estimates, the number of welfare recipients in the low-benefit states of the South would
have increased by 250 to 400%.   Even as FAP reached its high-water mark, passing the House
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in 1970 by a vote of 243-155, southern Democrats voted 85-17 against the bill.  This strong
opposition appeared despite the fact that the South's low-benefit, low tax, high-poverty status
meant that FAP promised the region dramatic fiscal relief.
Yet FAP's passage in the House indicated that Southern opposition alone, given the
ambivalence of business and the Republican party, was not enough to stop the bill.  Southern
opponents in the Senate, led by Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long, proved more
successful, but they relied heavily on support from liberal Democrats who found FAP
insufficiently generous.  In the crucial Finance Committee vote on FAP, three liberal Democrats
joined their conservative colleagues to produce a 10-7 vote against reporting the bill to the Senate
floor.
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miscalculated the prospects for maintaining generous benefits in a decentralized welfare system.  At the time,
however, it must have seemed difficult for liberals to back a radical reform of welfare that appeared to promise so
little for the northern poor.
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The core of opposition, however, was centered in the South and in wide segments of the
business community.    By providing a standardized and more generous benefit package for the
56
non-working but able-bodied poor, these proposals would have made it more difficult for
employers to keep wages down.  National standards would also have made it impossible to
sustain the lower social benefits that allowed southern officials to advertise the South as a low-
wage haven for business.
Despite occasional attempts at resurrection, FAP-type proposals have faded from the
American political agenda.  In retrospect, the fact that something like a NIT-style program for all
families came close to passage seems extraordinary.  The strong tendency of many whites to
identify income payments for the non-working poor as programs for blacks has greatly weakened
the possibilities for sustaining political alliances in favor of such policies.  By the early 1980s,
attention shifted to new proposals which would limit themselves to providing a wage subsidy for
poor workers.  Like FAP, these new proposals involved an "NIT"-style integration of taxes and
benefits.  Yet they differed in respects that would prove to be politically crucial, and would allow
the Earned Income Tax Credit to emerge as the great political success among American social
programs for the poor during the past decade.
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Although not enacted until 1974, minuscule until 1986, and relatively unknown even
today, this program has become a central component of national income maintenance policy.  By
1992, the program was estimated to benefit over 11 million families at a cost of $9.4 billion.  
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The further massive expansion introduced in the 1993 OBRA legislation -- $20 billion over five
years -- represented the largest funding increase in any program for low-income people in the past
two decades.   By 1996, spending on the EITC reached $25 billion -- more than double the
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federal government’s outlays on AFDC.  Moreover, the EITC's expansion through successive
enlargements in 1986, 1990, and 1993 was surprisingly uncontroversial.  Backed by Republican
and Democratic presidents alike, the EITC failed to generate anything like the virulent opposition
which efforts to expand other income transfer programs provoked.  Although the Republican
Congress did try to scale back the EITC after 1994, even this effort was essentially limited to a
(failed) attempt to repeal the EITC expansion enacted in 1993.  Compared with their assaults on
other anti-poverty programs, this was a very muted response.
The EITC's design -- a refundable tax credit, available only to low-income  working
families with children -- made it attractive to many of the political actors who have opposed the
expansion of other income transfers for the poor.  Because the program operated as a wage
subsidy, benefitting only those who work, it posed no threat to businesses or regions dependent
on low-wage jobs.  On the contrary, by making low-wage jobs more attractive to potential
workers, the EITC was particularly helpful to industries, and regions like the South, which rely
heavily on low-wage labor.  Thus the program had much to offer for those who have traditionally
sought to block national social policies for the working-aged population.  Republicans and
moderate Democrats have been enthusiastic about the program's strong work incentives, and have
helped assure broad, if intermittent, support for programmatic expansion.
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Piecing together an explanation for the EITC's enactment and growth is difficult, because
at every stage the program's fate has been joined to broader pieces of budget or tax legislation.  
6129
      On the causes and consequences of these budget-centered "mega-bills" see Joseph White and Aaron 62
Wildavsky,  The Deficit and the Public Interest:  The Search for Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s (Berkeley and
Los Angeles:  University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation), 1989; and C. Eugene Steuerle,  The Tax
Decade:  How Taxes Came to Dominate the Public Agenda (Washington, D.C.:  Urban Institute Press), 1992.  On
the case of the EITC, see Harmon,  Mega-bills, and Christopher Howard, “Happy Returns: How the Working Poor
Got Tax Relief,”  The American Prospect, 17, Spring, 1994, pp. 46-53.
      Ways and Means Chair Al Ullman (D-Oregon), another harsh critic of guaranteed annual income 63
proposals, was also influential.  Howard, "Exceptional Program," pp. 13-14. 
With no votes on the EITC itself, the "paper trail" that would allow a clear identification of
political cleavages over the program is sorely lacking.   However, it is clear that the tax credit
design of the program was tremendously helpful.  It made the program a compelling response to
concern about rapidly rising payroll taxes on the working poor.  It meant that higher program
spending was less visible to a deficit-conscious Congress and electorate.  Finally, it meant that the
EITC could be used flexibly to create a distributional "balance" in the periodic broad tax/budget
deals that became a staple of American politics following Reagan's election in 1981.  Program
cutbacks and tax increases in the broader legislative package could be offset for the working poor
by a rise in the EITC.  All three of the EITC's expansions came in the context of major package
deals:  the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the budget agreements of 1990 and 1993.  
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Significantly, all of these packages included significant cuts in other spending programs or tax
subsidies, including those benefiting the middle class.  Two of the three (1990 and 1993) were
designed to produce net reductions in real public expenditure.
Yet the EITC's long rise also reflects an innovative policy design that transformed
traditional opponents into allies.  The support of Russell Long -- a strong opponent of poverty
programs that might have adversely affected the willingness of workers to take low-wage jobs --
was crucial to the program's initial enactment.    Since then, Southern Democrats have often been
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supporters of an income support program that provides transfers in a manner highly favorable to
their regional political economy (Table 3).
Two striking differences between these two attempts to modernize income transfers for
low-income households in the United States reveal a lot about the new politics of the welfare
state.  First, the EITC succeeded even though the overall environment for social spending was far
less favorable than it had been during the consideration of FAP in the early 1970s.  Social30
spending grew more under Nixon than at any other time in post-war American history and yet
FAP failed to pass.  The EITC, on the other hand, grew massively over a ten-year period when
most programs were trying desperately (and often failing) to simply preserve existing funding
levels.
Table 3.  EITC Benefits By Region, 1992 
_____________________________________________________
     % Of Tax Filers   Mean 
 Receiving Benefits   Benefit
        
Northeast     8.13   $864.83
Midwest        9.74   $890.24
South      16.62   $954.43
West     11.36   $895.10
______________________________________________________
Source: Internal Revenue Service,  Statistics of Income Bulletin, Winter 1994-95, pp. 178-204
The second difference concerns the much lower-profile of the EITC.  The struggle over
FAP -- the first in a series of efforts to "end welfare as we know it" -- was front-page news.  The
program's demise was widely-noted, and generated a flurry of scholarly post-mortems.  By
contrast, most Americans still do not know what the EITC is, much less that the federal
government spent far more on the program last year than it did on AFDC.  This silent expansion is
reflected in the almost total absence of scholarly attention to the program.
Both these differences signal the quite different politics surrounding the two initiatives. 
FAP was presented as welfare reform, and became the target of an open dispute in which partisan
differences and the activities of well-mobilized groups were prominent.  The EITC has always
expanded as a piece of complex tax and budget deals.  Its expansion on three separate occasions
indicates the greater room for flexibility in these large, multi-faceted packages, as well as the
advantage of framing reforms as adjustments to tax codes rather than as new spending programs.
At the same time, the EITC was able to achieve a much broader coalitional base.  This is
critical in a political system where institutional fragmentation means that major policy initiatives
require more than a simple majority.  The EITC has served as an important balancing mechanism31
      On the recent politics of the EITC see R. Kent Weaver,  Ending Welfare As We Know It (Washington, 64
D.C.: Brookings), forthcoming, Ch. 12.
      See Paul Pierson, “The Deficit and the Politics of Domestic Reform,” in Margaret Weir, ed.,  New 65
Democrats and Anti-Federalists: The Politics of Social Policymaking in the 1990s (Brookings and Russell Sage
Foundation), forthcoming.
for legislation requiring support among liberals and moderates.  It has been able to play this role
because it benefits low-income groups, but unlike almost all other social policy initiatives it does
so while re-enforcing the low-wage labor market.  Thus, the EITC has been backed by a
remarkable coalition that includes the Congressional Black Caucus, Southern Democrats, and
(except in 1993) many Republicans.  It is hard to think of any other significant piece of social
legislation that has been able to generate a similar pattern of support.  Indeed, it runs directly
counter to what has traditionally been the strongest cleavage in the politics of American social
policy -- northern liberals vs. southern conservatives -- and indicates the dramatic nature of this
reform of the liberal welfare state.
In 1995, the EITC's remarkable momentum was finally challenged in the aftermath of the
stunning realignment of power in Congress.   Emboldened Republicans introduced a sweeping
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agenda of cutbacks in social spending, and for the first time the EITC appeared vulnerable. The
shift in Republican posture partly reflected the very marginal position of the working poor in the
party's electoral calculations, but was largely driven by the need to meet the party’s ambitious
goals for tax cuts and deficit reduction.  Yet proposed cutbacks quickly ran into difficulty. 
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Significantly, the Clinton administration  -- which showed little reluctance to sacrifice those
poverty programs which commanded limited public support -- quickly indicated that cuts in this
program for the working poor was one place it was prepared to make a stand.  Enthusiasm for
cuts in the Republican ranks was also limited.  The proposed EITC cuts would have a big effect
on the southern states where Republicans are trying to consolidate gains. The EITC might have
been cut as part of a larger package deal, but collapse of the Republican budget initiative in
January 1996 derailed these efforts, at least for now.  Notably, while political support for the
curtailment of AFDC (along with the drastic reduction of food stamp and SSI benefits for legal
aliens) was sufficiently widespread to allow passage of a free-standing bill, there was never any
suggestion that a similar open assault on the EITC would be politically feasible. 32
The shift in climate, however, signaled that while the EITC might be more popular than
other anti-poverty programs, its expansion required an environment where politicians feel a need
to respond in some way to the needs of low income households.  Given the balance of political
forces in American politics, the EITC’s phase of rapid growth has probably ended.  Yet the fact
remains that its political trajectory over the past decade has been unique among American income
transfer programs.  The program’s flexibility, opacity, relatively low cost, and compatibility with
the interests of key groups traditionally opposed to generous policies for the poor have allowed
the EITC to carve out a successful niche in a very harsh policy environment.
III.  The Politics of Implementing a Guaranteed Income
That both Canada and the United States have moved toward targeted tax/transfer systems
reflects the political appeal of such programs in an era of austerity.  This shift represents a striking
aspect of contemporary welfare state politics, and suggests how the current period must be
understood as not just one of welfare state retrenchment but also one of welfare state
restructuring.
We have stressed, however, that this restructuring has differed dramatically in both form
and degree in the two countries.  There is a big difference between implementing a narrowly
focused wage subsidy system and introducing a more generalized redesign of the welfare state
based on NIT principles.  Why such different outcomes?  Our account stresses three factors: (1)
distinct policy legacies; (2) the strength of opponents to a GI in the U.S.; and (3) institutional
arrangements which were more conducive to reform in Canada.  It is worth briefly reviewing each
point, because they provide a basis for evaluating the likelihood of implementing GI-style
programs in the U.S.
This investigation confirms a common finding in studies of social policy: existing welfare
state structures exert considerable influence over the patterns and types of reform which are
possible.  Canadian development of a NIT design for social transfers rests on the so-called
Beveridge base of postwar welfare state development, which includes extensive universal, flat-rate33
       Though commonplace in the literature, identifying such programs as Beveridge-inspired is somewhat 66
misleading.  The flat-rate Beveridge design implemented in Britain was based on the contributory principle not
citizenship.   
      See Jill Quadagno, “Social Security Policy and the Entitlement Debate in the First Clinton 67
Administration: The New American Exceptionalism,” in Michael Schwartz and Clarence Lo, eds.,  Clinton and the
Conservative Agenda (New York: Blackwell), forthcoming.
benefits and citizenship as the principle qualifying condition.  In an age of retrenchment, a shift
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toward a NIT-like welfare state represents a "natural" transition for nations with a Beveridge
base.  In Canada, cost savings could be achieved by redesigning traditional Beveridge programs
(pensions, family allowances) along NIT lines.  Change can be introduced incrementally through
the tax system.  Equally important, the powerful argument that voters are being deprived of
earned entitlements based on their own contributions need not be confronted.
The relative underdevelopment of NIT-like programs in the United States in part reflects
the absence of any Beveridge-type programs to reform.  The natural bridge to an NIT does not
exist, and reform instead requires a radical redesign in earnings-related, contributory systems. 
The experience of recent reform proposals is instructive.  In the case of pensions, the Concord
Coalition has suggested such a transformation, advocating that all social transfer programs be
subjected to an income test for families with incomes above $40,000 per year, with some of the
savings used to enrich benefits for low-income households.  The main target of the proposals is
Social Security, but includes programs such as the home mortgage interest deduction.  The
Coalition proposals helped shape the agenda of the 1994 Bipartisan Commission on Entitlements
and Taxation headed by Senators Danforth and Kerrey.   Requiring radical reductions in
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entitlements for the middle class, however, these proposals went nowhere, and comparative
evidence confirms that such a strategy faces enormous obstacles.  Unlike flat-rate benefits funded
from general revenue and for which the sole qualifying condition is citizenship, contributory
schemes like Social Security have, with few exceptions, been resistant to NIT-style retrenchment,
a result of the quasi-property rights created by such programs.   Rather than weakening the link
between contributions and benefits which would result from a NIT-style reform, the trend in
contributory schemes across Europe has been to tighten the link, a goal also advocated by a34
      On European trends see Myles and Quadagno, “Recent Trends.” One of the chief concerns of the U.S. 68
Advisory Committee on Social Security is the low “rate of return” on contributions for middle and upper income
contributors.  Thus the aim of many Committee members is  to restore “equity” to the system either through
privatization or the creation of personal security accounts so that middle and upper income earners get their
“money’s worth” out of the system. For a good nontechnical discussion of the various Committee proposals see
Joseph Quinn,  Entitlements and the Federal Budget: Securing our Future. (Washington: National Academy on
Aging, 1995)
      In both countries, UI benefits have had a less sacrosanct status, both because fewer citizens expect to 69
receive them and because concerns about work incentives have made the “deservingness” of recipients less
unambiguous.
      In the past,  higher EITC benefits for the working poor were won partly as an offset to higher 70
contribution rates (FICA taxes) for Social Security.   Again, however, existing contribution/benefit structures create
much less room for the US than Canada to move toward more NIT-type programs.  Relative to Canada, however,
US payroll taxes for Social Security (and Medicare) are very high, offering much less room for future trade-offs of
this sort. 
majority of members on the U.S. Advisory Committee on Social Security.      
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The absence of a suitable “bridge” is even more evident if one turns from pensions to
examine the possibilities for providing transfers to working-aged families.  In Canada, increases in
income-tested family benefits have been funded by lowering or eliminating family benefits to the
well-to-do and by lowering insurance-based unemployment benefits.    Here, one of the truly
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exceptional aspects of American social policy -- the virtual absence of traditional transfers for
working families -- becomes critical.  In the United States, the lack of a system of family
allowances, along with very low UI benefits and coverage create little room for significant cost
savings that might help fund NIT-style programs.   
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The second factor we emphasize has been the strong opposition to anything like a
Guaranteed Income in the United States.  Any strategy that proposed to extend the NIT model
beyond the working poor would ignite the traditional flash point of American social politics,
namely race.  As the recent history of AFDC bears out, racial antipathies have greatly weakened
the political appeal of programs designed to provide cash transfers to the non-working poor.
The other source of opposition has been those actors, particularly in the South, who have
sought to block policies which threatened the viability of low-wage labor markets.  Extensive
elements of the business community, the Republican Party, and the southern wing of the
Democratic Party have consistently opposed transfer programs that would increase workers’35
      Canada’s welfare state has also been shaped by the interests of regional economic actors, but the heavy 71
reliance of Canada’s poorest regions on seasonal, resource-extraction industries has led these areas to  favor
generous national social benefits, especially unemployment benefits, which support workers during slack periods. 
Thus the Canadian economy has not developed regional pockets where firms attempt to gain an edge by keeping
social wages lower than those of their competitors in other regions.
      Wolfson, 1994. 72
“reservation wages.”  The distinctive character of regional labor markets has played a critical role
in shaping American social policy.   Crucially, these concerns about maintaining a low-wage
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sector make the EITC a very attractive alternative: the EITC lowers reservation wages rather than
raising them.
Finally, we emphasize the impact of national political institutions.  It is conceivable that
the political opposition we mention might not matter as much in a Parliamentary system where a
majority party has considerable hope of enacting policies that significant interests find
objectionable.  This is much more difficult in the United States, where multiple veto points mean
that quite broad coalitions are usually required for reform.  The EITC has been advantaged by the
fact that it has appealed precisely to those elements of a reform coalition who were most likely to
defect, and who therefore had the greatest leverage over the final form of social policy legislation.
There is, in short, little reason to anticipate a move towards a true GI program in the
United States.  But let us assume that these obstacles are overcome and that a NIT style
retrenchment strategy takes hold in the United States.  What would be the distributional outcome
of an NIT/GI strategy?  While the question is purely hypothetical for the United States, it is highly
relevant for those industrialized countries which are clearly embarked on such a trajectory.  The
question has no single answer, since the result depends on the size and nature of the trade-off
between old and new programs, on the one hand, and unknown behavioral responses by
beneficiaries and future policy-makers on the other.  Over the medium-term, the evolution of
Canadian policy suggests an impressive formula for combining fiscal restraint with improved
social protection for those most in need.  GIS benefits for the elderly have risen in real and
relative terms, while the universal OAS and the C/QPP have stagnated. Rising GIS benefits have
brought old age poverty down much more sharply in Canada than in the United States.    Real
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child benefits for poor families have risen substantially since Canada began moving away from36
      Battle and Muszynski, “One Way to Fight Child Poverty.” 73
      Picot and Myles, “Social Transfers.”  As indicated earlier, this may now be changing. Child poverty 74
rose as expected following the recession of 1990-91. The rate fell in 1994 as recovery set in but rose unexpectedly
once again in 1995.
      Indeed this process is now underway. Traditional means-tested social assistance programs have been cut 75
in many provinces since the early nineties and further downward pressure is expected as a result the 1995 federal
budget which ended the Canada Assistance Plan replacing it with the Canadian Health and Social Transfer
(CHST).    
universal family allowances in 1978.   During a period when the wages of young adults -- the
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parents of young children -- have been falling, the Canadian tax-transfer have managed to stabilize
child poverty rates (and reduce the "poverty gap"), at least until the nineties.
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So far, Canadian developments have confounded critics who have maintained that targeted
programs will never sustain the political support needed to be effective.  In part because they
reach well into the middle class, the new income-tested programs in Canada have remained
popular.  There is no question that as a purely technical exercise, a NIT/GI array of social
expenditures can be designed that is more progressive and does more for the poor than those
currently available in either country.   The problem is a political not a technical one.
The expansion of the NIT/GI design is a product of an era of transition and retrenchment. 
The unanswered question is:  what happens when the transition is over? The Achilles heel of the
entire system lies in the fact that the process can only happen once.  Now that the benefits of
higher income Canadian families have been reduced or eliminated, they are no longer available to
finance future expenditure growth for low income families.  Should the number of such families
rise as a result, say, of continued growth in earnings inequality, the additional costs could only be
met through a process of welfare state expansion, not retrenchment.  Similarly, now that the
benefits that used to go to higher earners are gone, they are no longer available to absorb further
cuts in the social budget.  Instead, by necessity, future cost-cutters will have to look to the very
NIT programs produced during previous retrenchment exercises and to other programs for the
“poor” to reduce expenditures.
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Indeed, in Canada this process is now underway. Traditional means-tested social
assistance programs have been cut in many provinces since the early nineties and further37
downward pressure is expected as a result the 1995 federal budget which ended the Canada
Assistance Plan replacing it with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST).  Reduced
unemployment benefits and sharp reductions in UI coverage (a result of tighter eligibility rules)
will also increase demand for the new child programs.  Whether a NIT/GI design can stabilize at a
level that achieves the income security and redistributional aims of the old system while also being
politically sustainable is an open question.  CILN Working Papers  (downloadable)
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